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Abstract
Prior research has shown that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) plays an important role in the representation of the evaluation of stimuli, regardless
of stimulus modality. Based on these findings, researchers have proposed that the OFC serves a common currency function, allowing for the direct
comparison of different types of perceptual stimuli (e.g. food, drink, money). The present study was designed to extend this research and investigate
whether these same regions of OFC that have been identified in previous research are involved in evaluating imagined stimuli. Specifically, we asked
participants to draw on prior attitudinal knowledge to generate internal representations of liked and disliked exemplars from different categories during functional magnetic resonance imaging. The results of this study support the idea that imagined stimuli (regardless of stimulus category) are evaluated in the OFC using a common system that has been identified in previous research for externally perceived stimuli.
Keywords: evaluation, orbitofrontal cortex, attitudes, affect, neuroimaging

conducted on decision making in non-human primates
has shown that neurons in the OFC code for subjective
economic value, independent of visuospatial factors, motor responses and changes in decision context (Wallis and
Miller, 2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008). This
pattern of data has been taken to suggest that the OFC is
involved in translating evaluative representations (for instance, from the limbic system or sensory cortex) into an
abstracted common currency (Montague and Berns, 2002;
Murray et al., 2007). Functionally, these cross-modal valuation signals allow an organism to compare the value of
multiple stimuli during decision-making and determine,
for example, whether satisfying a need for food, water, sex,
money, or prestige is more important in any given situation. In this article, we extend the idea that the OFC is involved in a common valuation process by demonstrating
that the mere activation and consideration of affectivelyladen thoughts leads to OFC activity, independent of categorical differences.
Although previous research has established the link
between evaluation and the OFC, the paradigms used
typically involve a decision-making situation in which
participants determine their preference for one of two options (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2006; Tom et al.,
2007; Cunningham et al., 2009). These evaluations are
only a small subset of the evaluative judgments that people make each day. Humans spend much of their time
thinking about internally generated objects and events,
and in doing so; often determine the value of these

Introduction
Attitudes and evaluation are fundamental processes of
human thought, necessary for choosing products, making
appropriate approach and avoidance responses to stimuli,
and even determining one’s life goals. Recent research has
begun to decompose the neural systems involved in these
critical processes and has suggested a widespread network
of regions that support evaluation (see Cunningham and
Zelazo, 2007, for a review). In particular, this research has
indicated that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and subgenual cingulate1 play an important role in the representation
of subjective evaluation (Kringelbach, 2005), dissonance-related attitude change (J.M. Jarcho et al., submitted for publication), as well as the more general economic value or
goal value of stimuli (Padoa-Schioppa, 2007; Tom et al.,
2007; Hare et al., 2008). Linking this activity to behavior, activity in the OFC has been shown to relate to behavioral indicators of goal value (Wallis, 2006), such as participants’
willingness to pay for various foods (Plassman et al., 2007).
Specifically, whereas activity in medial OFC is typically related to representations of positive or rewarding information, activity in lateral OFC is related to representations of
negative or punishing information (Kringelbach and Rolls,
2004), suggesting a possible dissociation in the processing
of positive and negative information (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994).
An intriguing aspect of this activation in OFC is that it
appears to track value regardless of stimulus perceptual
modality (e.g. food, drink, money). For example, research

1. Studies of reward and positive hedonic states typically find activation that encompasses both the subgenual cingulate [Brodmann’s area (BA) 25]
and an area of posterior middle orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11). For simplicity, we use the term medial OFC in this article to refer to both regions.
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self-generated thoughts. For example, when thinking
about a possible new car, one may consider the positive
aspects of having the new car (e.g. better safety features)
as well as the negative aspects (e.g. the cost). Critically,
these evaluations can occur in the absence of any immediate perceptual stimulus. Indeed, one can even evaluate
options that do not yet exist. Thus, it seems important to
elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying such a common feature of mental life.
Although relatively little is known about the processes
involved in the evaluation of self-generated stimuli, there
is reason to believe these processes may be similar to those
present for stimuli that come from the environment. A proliferation of evidence over the last few years has demonstrated that many brain regions that are involved in basic
cognitive processes are also implicated in the simulation
of similar objects and behaviors. For example, research on
mental imagery has shown that visual cortex is involved in
the visualization of objects (Kosslyn et al., 1995), and that
auditory and motor imagery rely on some of the same processes as actually hearing something or manipulating an
object (Kosslyn et al., 2001). Furthermore, rather than imagery recruiting a set of generalized perceptual processes, the
brain appears to represent the specifics of the imagined category as if it were receiving an externally-presented stimulus. For example, when imagining faces and places, the
fusiform face area and parahippocampal place area show
increased activation, respectively (O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000). This suggests that the mind has an amazing
ability to conjure internal representations and then treat
these self-generated representations as if they were present. Thus, in the context of evaluation, it is possible that the
mere thought of a delicious birthday cake can take on the
same hedonic pleasure as being presented with and/or actually eating the cake.
This possibility lies at the heart of the somatic marker
hypothesis, which suggests that goal directed behavior is
facilitated by an as-if loop—the mental construction of
possible outcomes resulting from possible behaviors coupled with a simulation of the affective qualities of each
these possibilities (Damasio, 1996). By analyzing the affective qualities of these possibilities, an appropriate decision can be made. That is, to know whether a particular
course of action is preferable, one needs to be able to cognitively generate object representations and simulate hedonic value. This ability to compute the value of internal
representations is an essential component of cognitive processing that allows for the evaluation of the potential consequences of behavior without actually having to perform
the action. Indeed, self-regulation relies on these processes,
such as being able to determine the value of an object now
vs later (Mischel et al., 1989; McClure et al., 2004), or deciding whether an imagined end state (e.g. an athletic build) is
worth the cost of obtaining it [e.g. going to the gym every
day; see Trope and Liberman (2003)]. Not surprisingly, patients with OFC damage are severely impaired at making
such judgments, and as a result, often make decisions for
themselves that are detrimental in the long run (Bechara et
al., 1997, 2000).
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The present study was designed to investigate whether
the same regions of OFC that have been shown to be involved in the representation of the value are involved
when people evaluate self-generated stimuli. If the function
of the OFC is to represent stimuli in terms of some common currency, then activation in the OFC should be similar
for different types of stimuli, even when they are self-generated. To test this hypothesis, we adapted the procedure
of Johnson and colleagues (2006; Packer and Cunningham,
2009) and simply asked participants to draw on prior attitudinal knowledge to generate internal representations of
liked and disliked exemplars from different categories during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Specifically, participants were given a prompt to generate an
exemplar from one of three categories and consider its
positive or negative qualities (e.g. a disliked person). This
method provides a powerful test of our hypothesis because
it simply involves the construction of a self-generated representation. In contrast to most research that requires participants to indicate which stimuli they prefer, evaluate the
value of presented stimuli, or use an evaluation to make a
judgment, participants are only required to select, retrieve
and construct the representation, and do nothing with it
other than to hold it in mind and consider its positive or
negative aspects.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 13 right-handed individuals (10 females) with no history of neurological problems. All participants provided informed consent.
Procedure
During two runs of fMRI scanning, participants were
asked to imagine liked and disliked exemplars from three
different categories (i.e. objects, people and situations).
To minimize overlap in categories, participants were provided with instructions to help refine the appropriate categories for generated exemplars (objects were to be inanimate, people were to be individual people, and situations
were to be contextualized and could have multiple people and/or objects). Participants were informed of the categories prior to entering the MRI scanner. The experiment
had a 2 (valence: like, dislike) × 3 (category: people, situations, objects) within-subjects design. Prior to each block,
a fixation cross appeared on the screen for 10 s. Instructions for each block appeared in the center of the screen
for the full length of the block. Participants thought about
the positive and negative aspects of each self-generated
stimulus for 32 s and they did this for each type of stimulus (e.g. liked person, disliked object) once during each
block in a counterbalanced order. Thus, participants
thought about each of the six categories twice, once in
each of two runs, for a total of 12 blocks. Although this reduced the total number of trials, it helps to minimize any
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differences in the mental states of participants that could
vary with repeated testing, such as difficulty generating
novel exemplars.
fMRI scanning parameters and analysis
Participants were scanned using a Siemens 3T Tim Trio
scanner. Functional scanning was prescribed parallel to the
AC–PC line and nearly isotropic functional images were
acquired from inferior to superior using a single-shot gradient echo planar pulse sequence [32 axial slices; 3.5 mm
thick; 0.5 mm skip; echo time (TE) = 25 ms; retention time
(TR) = 2000 ms; in-plane resolution = 3.5 × 3.5 mm; matrix
size = 64 × 64; field of view = 224 mm). These parameters
provided excellent coverage of OFC for all participants.
Following functional imaging, a high resolution MPRAGE
anatomical image (176 sagittal slices; TE = 2.15 ms; TR =
1760 ms; resolution = 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm) was collected for
normalization.
Data were prepared for analysis using SPM8 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Data
were corrected for slice acquisition time and motion, coregistered to structural images, transformed to conform to
the default T1 Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) brain
interpolated to 3 × 3 × 3 mm3, and smoothed using an 9
mm FWHM (full-width-half-maximum) kernel. Data were
analyzed using the general linear model in SPM8. The
BOLD signal was modeled as a function of a canonical hemodynamic response function and its temporal derivative
with a 160 s high-pass filter.
Using the general linear model as implemented by
SPM8, individual level (first level) effects were estimated
by convolving a boxcar hemodynamic response function
against the preprocessed data for each of the six experimental conditions (e.g. liked people, disliked situations).
The resulting contrast maps were submitted to a 2 (valence) × 3 (category) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Orthogonal contrasts were estimated to
test the main effects of valence and category, as well as
the valence-by-category interaction. Effects are reported
as statistically significant if they exceeded P < 0.001 (uncorrected) with at least 20 contiguous voxels. For valence
effects, directional contrasts (e.g. positive > negative)
were computed for each of the three categories and subjected to a conjunction analysis to determine whether observed effects were found in each of the three conditions.
To establish category specific effects, a conjunction analysis was run using contrasts between one category and
the other two [i.e. (people > objects) and (people > situations)]. Regions are only discussed as valence or category specific if found in both the ANOVA main effect at
P < 0.001 (with at least 20 contiguous voxels) and in the
conjunction analysis at P < 0.05 (a joint probability of P
< 0.000125). Although P < 0.05 was our a priori cutoff for
the conjunction analyses, it should be noted that all reported effects in the text also survived a conjunction analysis of P < 0.01 (a joint probability of P < 0.000001).
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Results
Main effects of category
To ensure that participants were performing the task as
instructed, we first examined whether different categories
of stimuli (i.e. people, situations and objects) led to activation in neural networks associated with these categories
(see Table 1). As predicted, we observed greater activation in the medial area of superior prefrontal cortex (BA 9;
F2,24 = 11.88, P < 0.001; Figure 1) when participants thought
about people as compared with objects and situations.
In contrast, areas of inferior temporal lobe (F2,24 = 32.43,
P < 0.001), motor cortex (F2,24 = 29.20, P < .001), and inferior frontal cortex (BA 45; F2,24 = 25.72, P < 0.001) showed
greater activation to objects relative to social stimuli (i.e.
people, situations). These data are consistent with previous research showing that these regions differentiate ‘social cognition’ from ‘object cognition’ (e.g. Newman et al.,
Table 1. Main effects of category
Region

BA Side Voxels

ANOVA results
Medial superior frontal
10
Medial superior frontal
9/10
Medial superior frontal
9
Middle orbitofrontal
11
Precuneus
23
Posterior cingulate
23
Inferior temporal
37
Inferior frontal
48
Inferior frontal/pars triangularis 45
Middle frontal
8
Middle temporal
22
Middle temporal
20
Precentral gyrus
6
Precentral gyrus
6
Superior parietal
7
Middle occipital
39

R 161
R 		
R 		
R 361
R 419
L 122
L 584
L 201
R
39
L 128
L
41
R
47
L 246
L 		
L 533
R
21

F
11.88
11.58
9.58
24.54
27.60
13.55
32.43
25.72
12.59
16.11
12.17
11.93
29.2
10.55
26.08
9.93

X
6
9
3
3
3
–3
–51
–42
42
–27
–60
54
–48
–30
–21
54

Y

Z

60
15
51
27
48
39
54 –12
–57 27
–42
51
–57
–6
30
15
36
9
6
54
–9
–9
–12 –18
0
24
–9
51
–72
42
–69
27

Conjunction results
(Objects > people) and (objects > situations)
Inferior temporal lobe
37 L 1138
Superior parietal
19 L 1036
Precentral gyrus
6 L 914
Middle frontal
8 L 318
Superior motor area
6 L 2.07
Inferior frontal/pars triangularis 45 R 209

6.47 –48
6.11 –18
5.97 –48
4.81 –27
–6
3
3.93
45

–57
–72
0
6
48
39

–6
42
24
54

(People > objects) and (people > situations)
Medial superior frontal
9 R 681
Superior temporal sulcus
20 R
58
Superior temporal sulcus
21 L
23
Rectus gyrus
11 – 288
Precuneus
23 R 129

3.80
3.45
2.41
3.16
2.87

3
60
–63
0
3

48
–12
–12
42
–60

39
–21
–15
–21
24

(Situations > people) and (situations > objects)
Angular gyrus
39 L 278
Middle temporal gyrus
37 R 228
Precuneus
23 R
17

3.42
3.14
2.14

–51
48
18

–57
–63
–57

27
12
42

6
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Figure 1. Main effects of category: (a–c) Conjunction results overlaid on the default MNI template, (a) people > (objects and situations),
(b) objects > (people and situations), (c) situations > (people and objects). (d) Mean activation for each condition in the dorsal medial PFC.
(e) Mean activation for each condition in the motor cortex. (f) Mean activation for each condition in the inferior temporal lobe. (g) Mean
activation for each condition in the angular gyrus.

2005; Mitchell, 2006, 2009). Although the conjunction analysis for situations (relative to people and objects) revealed
areas specific to situations (Table 1), the activation for these
regions was not predicted a priori. Because situations are
often social (and may include people), we computed an
additional conjunction analysis comparing [(people > objects) and (situations > objects)]. This analysis indicated the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (t12 = 5.05, P < 0.01; MNI:
6, 57, −6) and precuneus (t12 = 5.26, P < 0.01; MNI: 6, −57,
27) were more active for people and situations than objects.
Thus, it appears that people and situations recruited a similar network of brain regions, although the dorsal medial
prefrontal cortex was active only when thinking specifically about individual people.
Main effects of valence
We then examined whether liked and disliked self-generated stimuli led to activity in the medial and lateral OFC,
respectively (see Table 2 for a full set of results). As predicted, areas of medial OFC (BA 11: F1,12 = 23.98, P < 0.001)
and subgenual cingulate (BA 25: F1,12 = 25.53, P < 0.001)
showed greater activation to imagined liked exemplars
than imagined disliked exemplars in both the main effects

Table 2. Main effects of valence
Region

BA

Side Voxels

F

X

Y

Z

ANOVA results
Subgenual cingulate
Middle OFC
Insula/inferior frontal (LOFC)
Precentral gyrus
Middle temporal
Cerebellum

25
11
47
6
39
n/a

L 363
R 		
L
45
R
64
R
74
R 109

25.53
23.98
28.19
19.91
18.41
30.85

–6
3
–30
45
48
24

33
39
21
–6
–69
–75

9
–6
–12
45
24
–36

Conjunction results
Liked > Disliked
Anterior cingulate
Subgenual cingulate
Middle OFC
Precentral gyrus
Angular gyrus

24
25
11
6
39

L 480
L 		
L 		
R 106
R
53

3.33
3.00
2.79
2.53
2.31

–3
–3
–12
48
54

33
42
54
0
–72

12
6
6
39
24

Disliked > Liked
Insula/inferior frontal (LOFC)
Superior frontal OFC
Cerebellum
Fusiform gyrus

47
11
n/a
18

L
L
R
L

3.42
2.48
3.38
2.61

–30
–21
24
–24

21
54
–75
–75

–15
–6
–36
–12

57
16
179
111
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Figure 2. Main effects of valence: (a) ANOVA results for main effects of valence in medial OFC, (b) conjunction analysis for liked objects,
people and situations (> disliked objects, people and situations; red = P < 0.05, yellow = P < 0.01), and (c) mean activation for each condition in the medial OFC.

ANOVA and conjunction analyses. The difference between liked and disliked exemplars was similar for each of
the three thought type conditions and there was no interaction between thought type and valence (Figure 2). Furthermore, we observed a region of left lateral OFC/insula (BA
47: F1,12 = 28.19, P < 0.001) that was more active to disliked
than liked objects (Figure 3). An additional region of lateral
OFC (BA 11) was identified in the conjunction analysis that
showed greater activation for disliked than liked exemplars (t12 = 2.48, P < 0.01) that was only marginally significant (P < 0.005) in the ANOVA using our a priori criterion.
As with the medial OFC, this difference in activation for
disliked compared with liked representations was found
for each of the three thought types and there was no interaction of thought type by valence. This pattern of data is
consistent with work showing a medial/lateral distinction
in OFC activity, with lateral regions being associated with
the monitoring of potential punishers and medial regions
being associated with representing the value of potential
rewards. Lowering the threshold to P < 0.005 or decreasing
the cluster size threshold did not result in additional meaningful activations.

Although these results are consistent with the idea
that the same areas of medial and lateral OFC are involved in the representation of positive and negative
valence for self-generated stimuli as for externally presented stimuli, without a within-subjects conjunction
these analyses cannot determine conclusively whether
the same regions are involved. To provide additional
support for our hypothesis, we conducted secondary
analyses of medial and lateral OFC using regions extracted from a study in which participants responded
to gambles and received rewards and punishments as a
function of their behavior (Cunningham et al., 2009). This
particular study was selected because the coordinates
for reward and punishment were similar to other reinforcement studies and because the data was collected on
the same Siemens 3T Tim Trio scanner. Region of interest masks were defined as 6 mm spheres around MNI:
12, 48, −6 for medial OFC and MNI: −30, 27, 0 for lateral OFC. Replicating the primary results of this study,
greater medial OFC activation was found for liked than
disliked exemplars (F1,12 = 6.81, P < 0.05) and greater lateral OFC activation was found for disliked than liked
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Figure 3. Main effects of valence: (a) ANOVA results for main effects of valence in lateral OFC, (b) conjunction analysis for disliked objects, people and situations (> liked objects, people and situations; blue = P < 0.05, light blue = P < 0.01), (c) mean activation for each condition in the lateral OFC (BA 47) and (d) lateral OFC (BA 11).

exemplars (F1,12 = 5.17, P < .05), and there were no interactions of valence and category for either medial (F2,24 =
0.02, P = .983) or lateral OFC (F2,24 = 0.19, P < 0.83).
Interaction effects
At the a priori thresholds, we found no interactions
between valence and category in any of our whole brain
analyses. However, because of our relatively small sample size, it is possible that effects existed below our relatively conservative thresholds. To test for this possibility, we dropped our statistical threshold to P < 0.01. At
this very liberal threshold, we found eight clusters that
had significant interactions with cluster sizes greater
than 10 contiguous voxels. However, plotting of each of
these effects did not reveal any theoretically meaningful
or readily interpretable patterns. Thus, these results suggest that although activation of the category representations involved distinct brain regions, when it came to
the representation of evaluation, a common network was
used.

Nucleus accumbens and amygdala
In addition to OFC, research on evaluation has suggested
that limbic areas are often involved when needing to make
predictions about stimuli. Specifically, regions of nucleus
accumbens (Nacc) and amygdala often are found in studies when participants need to retrieve information regarding the value of a presented stimulus (see Cunningham and
Zelazo, 2007 for a review). Interestingly, neither of these regions was found in our primary analyses when participants
self-generated liked and disliked exemplars. To examine
these regions more closely, data for each condition was extracted from 6mm spheres around right and left Nacc (MNI:
±9, 21, −3) and amygdala (MNI: ±24, −3, −18). Consistent
with research showing that Nacc is associated with reward
processing, results indicated that right Nacc (±9, 21, −3)
showed greater activation to liked than disliked stimuli (F1,12
= 9.95, P < 0.01). Left Nacc showed a similar effect, though
only at marginal levels of significance (F1,12 = 4.67, P = 0.052).
No effects of valence were found for either right (F1,12 = 1.45,
P = 0.252) or left amygdala (F1,12 = 0.70, P = 0.418).

292

Cunningham, Johnsen

and

Waggoner

in

Discussion
The evaluation of our cognitive representations is crucial for adaptive behavior, as it allows us to make decisions
about the hedonic value of a stimulus. Importantly, people
are able to engage in mental simulation in the absence of
any visually presented stimulus. This ability allows us to
plan for the future, anticipate affective outcomes, evaluate
objects in terms of their relevance to our goals, and engage
in goal-directed action. The present research extends prior
work by showing that the valence of imagined stimuli may
be represented in largely the same way as the valence of
observed stimuli, and by elucidating the brain systems that
may provide the mechanism by which this is possible. Specifically, the results of this study show that the OFC is involved in representation of evaluation regardless of stimulus modality, and that this is true for imagined stimuli.
Thus, it is possible that once representations are active (regardless of source), a common network is involved in evaluation and generation of affective responses.
Specifically, we found evidence that the medial OFC
was involved in the representation or processing of imagined liked stimuli, while areas of lateral OFC/insula were
involved in the representation/processing of imagined disliked stimuli. Interestingly, these regions did not overlap
with the regions associated with the processing of different
stimulus categories (i.e. people, situations, objects) suggesting that (i) people were activating different categories of
stimuli, and, critically, (ii) despite the differences in exemplar generation, the same neural systems differentiated the
valence of the exemplar. This suggests that although multiple brain systems retrieve and process different types of
stimuli (e.g. areas related to social cognition for imagining
people), a single system is used for representing the affective meaning of the stimulus. Just as visual, auditory and
somatosensory information is processed through a common affective system (the system that is also involved in
the processing of sensory information), so too are self-generated evaluative representations despite any differences
in retrieval.
This study also contributes to an understanding of the
deficits found in patients with OFC damage. Compared
with controls, OFC patients have difficulty with various
adaptive behaviors, such as postponing immediate rewards in order to gain more abstracted future rewards,
learning to update their behavior when stimulus-response
outcome contingences have changed (Bechara et al., 1996),
and many other decision making deficits associated with
the representation of value and social behavior (Beer et
al., 2006; see Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Wallis, 2007 for
reviews). To determine the locus of the problem, recent
work by Fellows and Farah (2007) has suggested that these
deficits in decision making among OFC patients stem from
an inability to form stable representations of preferences,
rather than a deficit in decision-making per se. They have
demonstrated that OFC patients make inconsistent preference judgments even in the absence of a decision-making task. Our data support this conclusion—in our task,
participants were not asked to do anything other than to
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hold the representation in mind and consider its positives
and negatives. Indeed, participants were not required to
make any response whatsoever. Because there was no presented stimulus, and no required response, this pattern of
results further bolsters the idea that the OFC is involved
in representing evaluations and may provide a crossmodal representation of value, here even for stimuli that
were merely imagined. Thus, providing additional support for the Fellows and Farah (2007) hypothesis that OFC
is involved in valuation, and not judgment per se, our data
suggest that the OFC appears to be responsible for representing the evaluation of all stimuli (e.g. person or place,
real or imagined) as a common currency, which then allows one to make informed decisions. When this region is
damaged, decision-making becomes impaired, likely because individuals are no longer able to make reasonable
comparisons between different options and possible outcomes (e.g. present vs absent, concrete vs abstract, monetary vs affective).
The representation of positive and negative affect is intertwined with our goals and desired outcomes. Just as
goals can shape evaluations (i.e. Cunningham et al., 2005,
2008; S.M. Mowrer et al., manuscript in preparation), our
evaluative processes serve the development and maintenance of our goal states. Part of goal-directed behavior involves the representation of possible hypothetical
outcomes, the methods by which we can achieve these outcomes, and our progress toward various goals. Thus, by
simulating the affective consequences of possible courses
of action, we can determine whether a goal is worth having
and pursuing. As such, it should not be surprising that the
act of retrieving certain goals activates the same medial region of OFC found in the present research. Indeed, research
on self-reflection, a process that is likely goal directed, often finds activity in medial areas of PFC (Kelley et al., 2002;
Ochsner et al., 2004). Using a similar paradigm to the one
used in the present research, Johnson and colleagues (2006)
and Packer and Cunningham (2009) observed greater medial OFC activation when participants engaged in self-reflection regarding their goals and evaluated their progress.
However, what is particularly interesting was that not all
goals activated this region. Specifically, increased activation was found only for promotion-focused goals and not
prevention-focused goals despite the fact that these goals
were presumably equally self-relevant. In contrast with
prevention goals, which concern one’s responsibilities, duties and obligations, promotion goals concern achievement,
opportunities and accomplishments—aspects that specifically concern gaining positive outcomes (Higgins, 1997,
2000). When considering the possible explanations for their
findings, Johnson and colleagues (2006) noted that the positive valence of promotion-focused goals may have contributed to their effect. Thus, given the self-enhancing biases
that are prevalent in our society, a large question remains
for the neuroscience community: are areas of medial OFC
active when people process reward-related information because it is deemed to be more self-relevant, or do we see
self processes recruiting these regions because thinking of
the self recruits positive hedonic biases?
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